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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON CRIME DETERRENCE LAWS

by
Mehdi Barati

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017
Under the Supervision of Professor Scott Adams

The main purpose of this dissertation is to apply empirical and theoretical economics
methodologies to analyze multiple topics in economics of crime, which have important
policy implications. This dissertation consists of three chapters.
Chapter 1 introduces new evidence on the impact of concealed carry weapon laws on
crime. For more than a decade, there has been an academic debate over the deterrence
effect of concealed carry weapon (shall issue) laws. However, all previous studies do
not consider the types of gun-carry laws in place prior to the adoption of “shall issue”
laws. Using difference-in-difference methodology, the findings of this study imply that
considering the type of regulations that states had prior to passing “shall issue” laws
matters and “shall issue” laws do have a deterrence effect under certain circumstances.
Adopting “shall issue” laws only reduces the crime rate in states with “no issue” laws
in place, and “shall issue” laws are redundant to “may issue” (restricted concealed
carry) laws in terms of crime reduction.
Chapter 2 investigates the deterrence effect of a marginal increase in punishment
severity for illegal gun carrying. I explore New York’s 2006 sentence enhancement for
illegal gun possession, which effectively added to the sentence for any crime committed
ii

with a firearm. Results show that the increase in punishment contributed to the
decreasing crime rates in New York after 2006.
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of a marginal change in punishment severity
on crime rate. I exploit Arkansas’ (AR) 2011 adjustment in the felony threshold for
theft from $500 to $1000. The decrease in punishment contributed to an increased theft
rates in AR, suggesting criminals responded to the reduced crime-specific cost.
Findings also indicate that the likely lower incarceration for theft did not lead to an
increase in other crimes.
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Chapter 1 : New Evidence on the Impact of Concealed Carry Weapon Laws on Crime
1.1. Introduction
The United States has more gun-related deaths than any other developed country in the
world.1 The estimated rate of private gun ownership (both licit and illicit) in the United States is
101.05 firearms per 100 people and the rate of all gun deaths per 100,000 people is 10.54.2
Although crime rates have gone down significantly since 1980, there were still 8,124 firearmrelated murders in 2014.3
Concealed carry weapon (shall issue) laws were introduced ostensibly to allow people to
defend themselves, yet many decried that simply adding firearms to a society with a high rate of
gun deaths is counterproductive. The two completely different beliefs about the effectiveness of
“shall issue” laws have shown up in estimations of their effects as well. Some researchers (Lott
and Mustard, 1997; Barons and Lott, 1998; Moody, 2001; Plassmann and Whitley, 2003; Gius,
2013), have shown that “shall issue” laws reduce the overall crime rate, but others (Rubin and
Dezhbakhsh, 1998; Ludwig, 1998; Ayres and Donohue, 2003a, 2003b), have shown the crime rate
has gone up since these laws were introduced.
What previous researchers have overlooked is that gun-carry regulations are heterogeneous
and might have differing effects. When adopting “shall issue” laws, some states are transitioning
from a “may issue” process while others are moving from a “no issue” process. The “shall issue”
and “may issue” laws both allow private citizens to carry concealed weapons, but they require

1

http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2013/09/19/u-s-has-more-guns-and-gun-deaths-than-any-other-country-studyfinds (Retrieve 2/24/2016)
2
http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/united-states (Retrieve 2/24/2016)
3
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/expanded-homicidedata/expanded_homicide_data_table_8_murder_victims_by_weapon_2010-2014.xls (Retrieve 2/24/2016)
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citizens to obtain a license in advance. While ‘‘shall issue’’ laws require the authorities to issue
permits to qualified applicants, ‘‘may issue’’ laws give the authorities more latitude to reject
applications. Therefore, unlike “shall issue” states, granting permits to carry is not the citizen’s
right in “may issue” states. This is why “may issue” laws are often called restricted concealed
carry or limited issue laws by some (ex., National Rifle Association).4 “No issue” laws, on the
other hand, do not allow private citizens to carry concealed weapons in public at all. The hypothesis
of this paper is that the effect of “shall issue” laws are likely dependent on the types of gun carry
regulations states had prior to the law change. Unlike “no issue” states, there is still a probability
that citizens of “may issue” states could obtain the concealed carry license, which could result in
criminal deterrence. Thereby, introducing “shall issue” laws would deter criminals in such a case
only if “no issue” laws were in place.
The findings of this paper indicate that considering the type of regulations that states had
prior to passing “shall issue” laws matters. While I find no deterrence effect for those states that
switch to “shall issue” law from “may issue” laws, there exist a significantly positive effect (crime
reduction) for those states that switched from “no issue” laws.
1.2. Background on “shall issue” Laws and Prior Research
During the 1920s and 1930s, many states passed laws that prohibited concealed carrying
(Cramer and Kopel 1994). Based on these laws, some states did not allow their private citizens to
carry concealed weapons at all (no issue laws) and some other states empowered local authorities
to decide about issuing concealed carry permits (may issue laws). Thus, before 1960, there were
only three types of gun carry regulations (“unrestricted”, “may issue”, and “no issue” laws) in the

4

http://web.archive.org/web/20081218111804/http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=18(Retrieve
2/24/2016)
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United States.5 States then began to adopt the concealed carry weapon laws in different time spans,
but this process was slow, and by 1988 only nine states had adopted “shall issue” laws (Grossman
and Lee, 2008).6 However, in the 1990s legislative activity accelerated, with 37 states enacting
“shall issue” laws as of 2008.
Criminal motives and deterrence research has long been the purview of criminologists,
psychologists, and sociologists. Gary Becker (1968) was the first economist who extended this
literature by introducing criminals’ income as a part of expected utility. In his paper, Becker
derived the supply of crime, which was negatively related to the punishment severity and the
probability of conviction.7 McDonald (1999) expanded Becker’s theory by adding more
determinant factors to the supply of crime function. He specifically showed that the less restrictive
gun possession laws had a negative impact on the supply of crime. McDonald’s (1999) findings
are based on deterrence theory that implies criminals commit fewer crimes once they perceive the
cost of committing a crime to be too high. Criminals have to be more cautious because their
potential victims might be armed and more capable of protecting themselves. On the other hand,
according to Duggan’s (2001) findings, the mere presence of additional firearms in a community
following the passage of less restrictive gun carrying legislation might increase the crime rate due
to guns landing into the wrong hands. This is the so-called “more guns, more crime” effect.

5

An Unrestricted gun-carry Laws are those that allow any private citizen to purchase, sell, and carry weapons
(concealed or unconcealed) without any restrictions. Before 2003 Vermont was the only state with No-Control law.
Alaska (2003), Arizona (2011), and Wyoming (2013) switched back to unrestricted laws as well.
6
Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington
7 In Becker’s (1968) paper the expected utility from committing an offense is defined as:
=
−
+ 1−
, where is an offender’s income from committing an illegal activity; is
his utility function; is his probability of conviction; and is to be interpreted as the monetary equivalent of the
punishment
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Existence of the concealed carry weapon laws provides researchers with a good source to
test the net effect of less restrictive gun laws. According to McDonald’s (1999) findings, moving
toward less restrictive gun carry (Ex. “shall issue”) laws, positive deterrence effect dominates the
negative “more guns, more crime” effect. This indicates that there should be lower crime observed
in states that adopt “shall issue” laws. By using monthly homicide data from 1973-1992 for five
counties, McDowall et al. (1995) was one of the first applied studies that assessed the effect of the
“shall issue” laws.8 Using the Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model, the
authors concluded that there is not enough evidence that “shall issue” laws could decrease the
crime rate.
Lott and Mustard (1997) invigorated the literature and gun lobbyists by applying
difference-in-difference (DD) methodology to estimate the effect of “shall issue” laws on the crime
rate for the period of 1977-1992. Based on their findings, Lott and Mustard concluded that states
with “shall issue” laws have lower crime rates than states with more restrictive gun carry
regulations. Since then, this study has been endlessly cited by the National Rifle Association
(NRA) and other gun advocates in support of their votes on behalf of concealed carry weapon
laws.9
Lott and Mustard’s findings were striking and prompted a large number of academic
responses. By changing the econometric methodology and/or the model specification, other
researches reanalyzed the Lott and Mustard dataset. Among these papers, Barons and Lott (1998),
Bartley and Cohen (1998), Moody (2001), and Plassmann and Tideman (2001) corroborated the

8
Hinds county in Mississippi (Jackson), Multnomah and Clackamas (both counties were combined), Portland counties
in Oregon, and Dade (Miami), Duval (Jacksonville), and Hillsborough (Tampa) counties in Florida)
9
http://mediamatters.org/blog/2014/08/04/national-rifle-association-offers-weak-defense/200314(Retrieved
2/24/2016)

4

findings of Lott and Mustard. On the other hand, Rubin and Dezhbakhsh (1998), Ludwig (1998),
and Ayres and Donohue (2003a, 2003b) concluded that “shall issue” laws increase the crime rate.
Black and Nagin (1998) claimed that Lott and Mustard’s findings are highly sensitive to minor
changes in the sample. Based on their findings, Black and Nagin believed that there is not enough
evidence to show a significant impact of “shall issue” laws on the crime rate.
Due to many different and conflicting ideas about the effect of “shall issue” laws, the
National Research Council (NRC) set aside one chapter of its book (Firearms and Violence: A
Critical Review (2005)) to explore the causal effects of concealed carry weapon laws on crime
rates. After reviewing the existing (and conflicting) literature and undertaking their own evaluation
by using county-level data for the period of 1977-2000, a majority of the panel members came to
the conclusion that the existing research failed to determine the true impact of “shall issue” laws.
They also concluded that their own empirical results were imprecise and highly sensitive to
changes in model specification and data period.
Donohue et al. (2010) raise the point that there may be serial correlation in panel data
studies. This can lead to the underestimation of standard-errors (Wooldridge, 2003, 2006; Angrist
and Pischke, 2009) posit that clustering standard-errors is a necessary correction in order to address
this problem (Arellano, 1987). By using both county level and state level dataset for the period of
1977-2006 and after clustering standard-errors, Donohue et al. (2010), which is arguably the most
reliable analysis to date, also found no statistical support for the deterrent effect of “shall issue”
laws and brought all previous researches’ findings under question.
Although Donohue et al. (2010) contradicts findings of McDonald (1999) concerning the
deterrence effect of the less restrictive gun carry laws, they do not consider the types of gun-carry
regulations in place prior to the adoption of the “shall issue” laws. This is perhaps a reason that
5

they failed to find statistical support for an effect of “shall issue” laws. In this paper, I also find no
statistical support for the impact of “shall issue” laws on the general crime rate. However, once I
introduce separate treatment groups—those that switch from “may issue” process and those that
switch from “no issue” process—I conclude that “shall issue” laws decrease the crime rate if states
adopt “shall issue” laws from “no issue” laws.
1.3. Conceptual Framework and Central Hypothesis
As mentioned, the contribution of this paper is based on this hypothesis that the deterrent
effect is stronger when the changes in gun carry laws occur from “no issue”, rather than “may
issue”. When law change occurs from “no issue”, potential criminals are more deterred because
their potential victims (private citizens) who were not allowed to carry guns at all, now have the
right to carry guns concealed and are able to defend themselves. This is not necessarily the case
when states change their laws from “may issue”. Under “may issue” laws, there is still the
probability that private citizens carry guns to defend themselves.
It also should be taken into consideration that adopting less restrictive gun laws like “shall
issue” persuade people to buy more guns. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that adopting “shall
issue” laws will increase the number of guns sold. The effect of “shall issue” laws on gun sales is
important because many researchers (Ex. Cummings and Koepsell, 1997; Mark Duggan, 2001;
Miller et al., 2002; Grassel and Wintemute, 2003) believe that the overall rate of death and suicide
is usually higher in states with a high percentage of gun ownership than other states. Branas and
Richmond (2009) also showed that those who possess handguns are more likely to die from
violence than those without handguns. Thus, according to the hypothesis of this paper, “shall issue”
is redundant to “may issue” and adopting the “shall issue” laws from “may issue” is an unnecessary
change which might only serve to stimulate gun sales, without any benefit.
6

1.4. Data
In order to further understand the effect of “shall issue” laws, I identify a set of states that
enacted the concealed carry weapon laws from 1991-2008. I restricted the period to 1991-2008
because this is a period in which most of the states passed their “shall issue” laws.10 Moreover, in
their paper, Ayres and Donohue (2003a) pointed out that crime rose (especially in “non-shall issue”
states) dramatically during the period from 1985-1992 and including this period may confound the
estimation of the effect of “shall issue” laws. Ayres and Donohue’s (2003a) findings showed when
they restricted the period to 1991-1999, there was a significant increase in crime rates. I also
limited the period to 1991-2008 to avoid the probable impact of the great recession on crime rates.
Additionally, after 2008 some states started changing their gun-carry laws from “shall issue” to
“no restriction”. This caused the number of “shall issue” states to drop from 37 in 2008 to 31 in
2015.
In 1991, 16 states were already “shall issue”, therefore I always use these 16 states as
control states as their status never changes. Between 1991 and 2008, 22 more states also adopted
the “shall issue” laws at different times, which form my treatment group. As a result, the control
group is composed of two types of states— those that are still not “shall issue” and those that
already were “shall issue”. Table 1 lists gun carry regulations for all states and also the type of gun
carry laws that states had prior to the adoption of “shall issue” laws.
By 2008, 37 U.S. states had passed “shall issue” laws. In this paper, information about the
effective dates and coverage of the concealed carry laws were compiled from a variety of sources.
The primary sources were the NRA, each state’s legislation, and related news reports. In some

10

From 16 states in 1993 to 37 states in 2008
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cases of ambiguity, I also contacted different state police departments, sheriff’s departments, state
attorney general offices, and private attorneys who were specialists in gun-related laws to find out
the effective dates of the concealed carry weapon laws in different states.
In order to study the effect of the concealed carry weapon laws on the crime rate, I used
the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (FBI-UCR) dataset for six different types of crimes (murder,
robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, larceny, and motor vehicle theft) for the period of 19912008. Following the majority of previous papers, I also chose these crimes because they are the
only reported crime dataset by FBI-URC.11 This dataset allows for yearly variation for each type
of crime for all states. I dropped Alaska because they have changed their laws twice during the
time span, rendering identification less clean.
Additionally, I control for the effect of other crime preventing policies —add-on gun laws,
three-strike legislations, and permit to purchase a handgun laws— that might also affect crime
rates. Both add-on gun laws and three-strike legislations are punishment enhancement policies that
are designed to reduce the crime rate. While the add-on gun laws impose harsher sentences for
offenders who possess firearms during the commission of a felony, three-strike legislation imposes
harsher sentences on offenders who are previously convicted of two prior serious offenses and
then commit a third. States with permit to purchase a handgun laws require their citizens to obtain
a permit for buying handguns besides obtaining a permit to carry handguns concealed.
In order to take into consideration the effect of economic conditions on crime rates,
following Plassmann and Tideman (2001) and Donohue et al. (2010), I control for unemployment

11

Since FBI recently changed the definition of rape, I did not include rape
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rates obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Following Lott and Mustard (1997) and
most of the subsequent studies, I also add the log of population by age, race, and sex groups,
number of police officers, lagged arrest rates, and states’ income per capita as control variables.
All demographic data are collected from the US Census. FBI-UCR dataset provides me with the
number of police officers and arrest rates. Data for income per capita are retrieved from Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Table 2 reports the mean of crime rates and other control variables in
this analysis for both the treatment and control states. According to this table, before adopting
“shall issue laws” most of the crimes in treated states had higher rates than those of control states.
1.5. Methodology
I begin by dividing all states into two groups—those that have changed their laws to “shall
issue” by 2008 and those that have not changed their laws since 1991.12 The goal is to see how
adopting the concealed carry weapon laws might affect different types of crimes no matter what
types of gun carry regulations states had prior to the adoption of “shall issue” laws. The intent is
to replicate existing works with some modest improvements. Specifically, I use updated data, a
larger control group, and more appropriate econometric methods. For this analysis I used the
following regression model:
=

+

+ Y∗ S

+

+

+

Subscript “s” denotes states and subscript “y” denotes years. The terms

(1.1)
and

are the

state and year fixed effects. In order to provide the most robust estimates, following Donohue et
al. (2003a and 2010) I also added Y ∗ S

in order to control for state-specific time trends. The

variable CR is the log of number of crimes per 100,000 people for the six different categories of

12

States could change their laws from “no issue” or “may issue.
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crimes that I mentioned earlier. Specifically, I will run the model six times (once for each type of
crime) to study the effect of “shall issue” laws on each type of crime separately. Our variable of
interest (CCW) is the dummy that shows if states adopted the “shall issue” laws or not.13 The term
represents the state-level, time-varying set of control variables that might affect crime. As
mentioned, these variables include the log of population by age, race, and sex groups, number of
police officers, lagged arrest rates, income per capita, and other crime preventing regulations.
The main contribution of the paper is estimating separate effects by legislation type. Below
is the model that I use for this analysis.
=

+

+ Y×S

+

+ !

+

+

(1.2)

In model (2), the variable MTS is set to one if the states changed their laws from “may
issue” to “shall issue” laws and is set to zero otherwise. Thus, the treated states are those that adopt
“shall issue” laws from “may issue” laws between 1991 and 2008.The variable NTS is set to one
if the states changed their law from “no issue” to “shall issue” laws and is set to zero otherwise.
So, the treatment group are those states that switch to “shall issue” laws from “no issue” laws
between 1991 and 2008.
Assuming that control states and treatment states are comparable, the regressions for both
models (1) and (2) use weighted least square where the weighting is each state’s population. As
noted above, standard errors are also clustered at the state level to allow for correlation in errors
over time in a given state.

13

CCW=1 if state is shall issue and zero otherwise
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1.6. Results
This section consists of three parts. The first is essentially a replication exercise of previous
approaches, albeit one with a larger control group and more appropriate econometric methods. In
the second part, I examine if the type of regulations that states had prior to the adoption of “shall
issue” laws matter or not. Finally, in the last part, I also apply the Probit estimator to check whether
or not the findings are robust with respect to changing econometric methods.
1.6.1. Replication of existing work
I first estimate model (1) in order to study the effect of adopting “shall issue” laws on the
crime rate without considering the kind of regulations states had in the past. As mentioned, in order
to prevent non-independence of observations from the same state that might affect the inference,
standard-errors are clustered at the state level in all regressions. As table 3 makes it evident,
estimations for the impact of “shall issue” laws are insignificant for all types of crime. These results
are consistent with those of the NRC committee (2005) and Donohue et al. (2010), which imply
there is not enough statistical support for the impact of “shall issue” laws on the crime rate.
1.6.2. Differential effects of moving from May Issue vs. No Issue
In order to test whether or not the deterrent effect is stronger when the changes in gun carry
laws occur from “no issue” rather than “may issue” (which is this paper’s hypothesis) model (2)
is estimated. Based on model (2) estimations, which are reported in table (4), adopting “shall issue”
laws have no effect on crime rates when states change their laws from “may issue”. Yet, there will
be a significant reduction in theft crimes (robbery, burglary, and larceny) when a law change takes
place from “no issue” laws.
For motor vehicle theft (which is another theft crime) the coefficient is still negative,
sizable, and very close to being significant. One problem, which might cause the result for motor
11

vehicle theft to be insignificant could be state-level data. Using state-level data one cannot
differentiate urban and rural areas. This issue can bias the results toward no effect of the “shall
issue” laws because in most rural areas in the states, the crime rate are low already, and there is
less room for measurable downward effects of “shall issue” laws. However, this does not mean
that the “shall issue” laws are not effective laws. I still must use state level data. Maltz and
Targonski (2003) shows that FBI-UCR’s county level data are less reliable because the law
enforcement agencies voluntarily report the crime data to the FBI. Their findings also imply that
by imputing missing agency data, the FBI’s state-level data are less problematic.
Estimates of model (2) do not provide enough statistical support for the impact of “shall
issue” laws on murder and aggravated assault. One could assume that murder and aggravated
assault are less calculated crimes and more heat of the moment crimes. Thus, their criminals may
be less inclined to think through whether victims have a gun or not, which skew estimations toward
no effect of “shall issue” laws.
The first approach used in the current study is simple DD, which is common in the literature
with clustered standard-errors at the state level. In DD methodology, the basic assumption is that
the control group is a good counterfactual for the treatment group. That is, absent the intervention
we would expect the same pattern of outcomes to exist over time in each group. To test this, I add
leads to my model to determine if there were any significant differences in states by which gun
legislation regimes fell and I find no differences. Plotting pretreatment trends can also help to
recognize if the control group is a good counterfactual for the treatment group. In this study, as
different states adopt “shall issue” laws at different times, it is difficult to graph one specific
pretreatment trend for the treatment group. In order to resolve this issue, I only plot the trends for
the 1991-2000 period in which 13 states switched to “shall issue” laws. Looking at graphs 1-6, it
12

can be seen that for all types of crime the pretreatment trends are the same in both control and
treatment states. Additionally, as a placebo test to verify the validity of the research design, I drop
all post-intervention years. Then I randomly assign fake treatment years to examine whether or not
there is still a significant reduction in crime rate. As it can be seen in table (5) obtained results
confirm that pre-treatment crime trends do not play a significant role in reducing crime rate,
indicating that the results presented throughout are not spurious.
1.6.3. Robustness check
Plassmann and Tideman (2001) suggest that the count nature of crime data renders simple
Weighted Least Square (GLS) to be the most appropriate method to estimate the effect of the
concealed carry weapon laws. Using simple GLS is especially problematic for crimes with low
rates, such as murder and robbery. In order to consider this issue I also apply the Probit analysis
by estimating:
="

#

+

(1.3)

$

“Y” is the percentage of crime rate in state “s” in year “y” and, “X” represents other variables that
might affect “Y”, “c” is a state-specific time trend, and " . is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. In table 6, model (3) is estimated using the inverse normal of the crime rate
as the dependent variable. As it can be seen in table 6 findings of this paper are not sensitive to
change in estimation method and using non-linear methods do not change the findings. Overall, it
can be said that not considering the gun carry regulations prior to the adoption of “shall issue”
laws was the main reason that studies like Donohue et al. (2010) obtained no statistical support
for effect of “shall issue” laws.
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As discussed before, less restrictive gun laws (Ex. shall issue laws) likely result in more gun sales.
Thus, according to the findings of the current study, for states with “may issue” regulations in
place, adopting “shall issue” laws could only impact the gun sales without reducing crime. Since
reviewing previous research suggests more guns will lead to more death (Cummings and Koepsell,
1997; Mark Duggan, 2001; Miller et al., 2002; Grassel and Wintemute, 2003), adopting “shall
issue” laws from “may issue” appears to potentially be an unnecessary and dangerous change.
1.7. Conclusion
The concealed carry weapon laws were passed in an attempt to reduce the crime rate.
Policymakers believed that, although an increase in gun availability might lead to increased crime,
the deterrent effect of “shall issue” laws dominates and will eventually reduce the crime rate. In
this paper, I used DD methodology to estimate the effect of the “shall issue” laws on six different
crime rates. The main difference between the current study and the previous ones is dividing the
treated states into a “may issue” group and a “no issue” group.
Findings of this paper confirm that the concealed carry weapon laws likely reduce the crime
rate, but only when the law change occurs from “no issue”. However states that move from “may
issue” to “shall issue” do not see a change because in “may issue” states, there is still a probability
for normal citizens to obtain a concealed carry permit. Additionally, adopting “shall issue” laws is
likely to increase the number of gun sales. Therefore, it is potentially true that moving from “may
issue” to “shall issue” is a redundant change in terms of crime deterrence, with potentially
dangerous consequences.
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Figure 1.1. Pretreatment Trend for Robbery in both control and treated states
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Figure 1.2. Pretreatment Trend for Burglary in both control and treated states
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Figure 1.3. Pretreatment Trend for Larceny in both control and treated states
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Figure 1.4. Pretreatment Trend for Motor Vehicle Theft in both control and treated states
Vehicle Theft per 100,000 People
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Figure 1.5. Pretreatment Trend for Murder in both control and treated states
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Figure 1.6. Pretreatment Trend for Aggravated Assault in both control and treated states
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Table 1.1. Year of Enactment of ‘‘Shall Issue’’ Laws
States
State Gun Carry Laws
Passage date
Alabama
Shall issue
<1991
Alaska*
Shall issue (change from No issue)
1994
Arizona
Shall issue (change from No issue)
1994
Arkansas
Shall issue (change from No issue)
1995
California
May issue
<1991
Colorado
Shall issue (change from May issue)
2003
Connecticut
Shall issue
<1991
Delaware
May issue
<1991
District of Colombia
No issue
<1991
Florida
Shall issue
<1991
Georgia
Shall issue
<1991
Hawaii
May issue
<1991
Idaho
Shall issue
<1991
Illinois
No issue
<1991
Indiana
Shall issue
<1991
Iowa
May issue
<1991
Kansas
Shall issue (change from No issue)
2006
Kentucky
Shall issue (change from No issue)
1996
Louisiana
Shall issue (change from May issue)
1996
Maine
Shall issue
<1991
Maryland
May issue
<1991
Massachusetts
May issue
<1991
Michigan
Shall issue (change from May issue)
2001
Minnesota
Shall issue (change from May issue)
2003
Mississippi
Shall issue
<1991
Missouri
Shall issue (change from No issue)
2003
Montana
Shall issue
<1997
Nebraska
Shall issue (change from No issue)
2006
Nevada
Shall issue (change from May issue)
1995
New Hampshire
Shall issue
<1991
New Jersey
May issue
<1991
New Mexico
Shall issue (change from No issue)
2003
New York
May issue
<1991
North Carolina
Shall issue (change from No issue)
1995
North Dakota
Shall issue
<1991
Ohio
Shall issue (change from No issue)
2004
Oklahoma
Shall issue (change from No issue)
1995
Oregon
Shall issue
<1991
Pennsylvania
Shall issue
<1991
Rhode Island
May issue
<1991
South Carolina
Shall issue (change from May issue)
1996
South Dakota
Shall issue
<1991
Tennessee
Shall issue (change from May issue)
1994
Texas
Shall issue (1change from No issue)
1995
Utah
Shall issue (change from May issue)
1995
Vermont
Unrestricted
<1991
Virginia
Shall issue (change from May issue)
1995
Washington
Shall issue
<1991
West Virginia
Shall issue
<1991
Wisconsin
No Issue
<1991
Wyoming*
Shall issue (change from May issue)
1994
*Alaska in 2003 changed its laws to unrestricted once again. That is why Alaska is excluded from treatment group
20

Table 1.2. Mean of key variables in analysis before adopting of “shall issue” laws
Means for
Means for Treated
Variable
Control States
States
Number of Crime per 100,000 people:
Robbery
Burglary
Larceny
Murder
Motor Vehicle Theft
Aggravated Assault
Number of Arrests per 100,000 people:
Robbery
Burglary
Larceny
Murder
Motor Vehicle Theft
Aggravated Assault
Other
Population Characteristic:
State population
Population per square mile
Male population
Female population
Race Age data (% of population):
White
Black
Other Race
Male 10-19
Male 20- 29
Male 30-39
Male 40-49
Male 50-64
Male over 65
Female 10-19
Female 20- 29
Female 30-39
Female 40-49
Female 50-64
Female over 65
Number Police Officer per 100,000
Male officers
Female officers
Unemployment rate
Income Per Capita ($/year)
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136.15
725.12
2366.98
6.01
385.12
276.18

131.45
863.96
2708.53
6.24
388.63
317.63

36.46
88.00
396.45
11.22
42.28
112.75
3470.44

30.36
97.69
493.27
6.11
41.55
117.70
3839.30

5667791
413.37
2776931
2890860

4798127
80.69
2341280
2456847

82.06
11.69
6.25
7.34
6.97
7.38
7.35
7.59
5.36
6.98
6.85
7.42
7.49
8.04
7.49

87.81
9.14
3.05
7.67
7.10
7.96
7.05
6.57
5.09
7.30
7.03
8.02
7.18
7.01
7.30

204.21
23.66
5.09

185.2964
19.0738
5.14

29635.74

22759.16

Table 1.3. Effect of adopting “shall issue” laws on crime rates without consideration of the type of the
regulation states had in place prior to the law change (1991-2008)
VARIABLES
Shall Issue

Robbery Burglary Larceny

Motor
Murder
Vehicle Theft
-0.0218 -0.0404 -0.0318
-0.00486
-0.0265
(0.0331) (0.0317) (0.0289)
(0.0340)
(0.0396)

Aggravated
Assault
0.0562
(0.0342)

Observations

770

770

770

770

770

770

Other Policies
State and Year Fixed Effect
State Specific Fixed Time Trend

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively

The treatment variable is “shall issue” that equals one when a states adopt the “shall issue” laws, regardless
of type of the gun carry laws that state had in the past, and zero otherwise. Estimations in every cell are
obtained from a separate regression. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level
to allow for arbitrary patterns in heteroskedasticity and correlation in errors over time in a given state. All
regressions use weighted least square where the weighting is each state’s population.
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Table 1.4. Effect of adopting “shall issue” laws on crime rates with consideration of the type of the
regulation states had in place prior to the law change (1991-2008)

0.0149
(0.0377)

Motor
Vehicle
0.0696
(0.0465)

0.0225
(0.0281)

Aggravated
Assault
0.0449
(0.0473)

-0.0727* -0.0923** -0.0651*
(0.0413) (0.0393) (0.0367)

-0.0581
(0.0415)

-0.0615
(0.0575)

0.0426
(0.0449)

VARIABLES

Robbery

Burglary

Larceny

May Issue to Shall Issue

0.0495
(0.0449)

0.0323
(0.0378)

No Issue to Shall Issue

Murder

Observations

770

770

770

770

770

770

Other Policies
State and Year Fixed Effect
State Specific Time Trend

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively

The variable “may issue to shall issue” equals one when a state adopt the “shall issue” laws from “may
issue” laws and zero otherwise. The variable “no issue to shall issue” equals one when a state adopt the
“shall issue” laws from “no issue” laws and zero otherwise. Estimations in every cell are obtained from a
separate regression. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered at the state level to allow for
arbitrary patterns in heteroskedasticity and correlation in errors over time in a given state. All regressions
use weighted least square where the weighting is each state’s population.
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Table 1.5. Placebo test for the effect of adopting “shall issue” laws on crime rates with consideration
of the type of the regulation states had in place prior to the law change (1991-2002)
Murder

Aggravated
Assault

0.0890
(0.0613)

Motor
Vehicle
Theft
0.197**
(0.0953)

0.00501
(0.0655)

-0.0620
(0.107)

-0.0459
(0.0595)

-0.0319
(0.0610)

-0.0645
(0.0836)

0.0590
(0.0698)

-0.197
(0.122)

381

381

381

381

381

381

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

VARIABLES

Robbery

Burglary

Larceny

May Issue to Shall Issue

0.0284
(0.0684)

0.0655
(0.0556)

No Issue to Shall Issue

0.0283
(0.141)

Observations
Other Policies
State and Year Fixed Effect
State Specific Time Trend

**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively

The variable “may issue to shall issue” equals one when a state adopt the “shall issue” laws from “may
issue” laws and zero otherwise The variable “No issue to shall issue” equals one when states adopt the
“shall issue” laws from “no issue” laws and zero otherwise. Estimations in every cell are obtained from
a separate regression. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered at the state level to allow
for arbitrary patterns in heteroskedasticity and correlation in errors over time in a given state. All
regressions use weighted least square where the weighting is each state’s population. I drop all postintervention years. Then I randomly assign fake treatment years to examine whether or not there is still
a significant reduction in crime rate.
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Table 1.6. Effect of adopting “shall issue” laws on crime rates with consideration of the type of the
regulation states had in place prior to the law change , using the Probit estimator (1991-2008)
VARIABLES

Robbery

Burglary

Larceny

Motor
Vehicle
Theft

Murder

Aggravated
Assault

May Issue to Shall Issue

0.0151
(0.0135)

0.0128
(0.0131)

0.00739
(0.0156)

0.0235
(0.0156)

0.00605
(0.00834)

0.0148
(0.0153)

No Issue to Shall Issue

-0.0222* -0.0324** -0.0256*
(0.0127) (0.0139) (0.0148)

-0.0191
(0.0139)

-0.0178
(0.0167)

0.0138
(0.0142)

Observations

771

771

771

771

771

771

Other Policies
State and Year Fixed Effect
State Specific Time Trend

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively

The variable “may issue to shall issue” equals one when a state adopt the “shall issue” laws from “may
issue” laws and zero otherwise The variable “No issue to shall issue” equals one when states adopt the
“shall issue” laws from “no issue” laws and zero otherwise. Estimations in every cell are obtained from
a separate regression. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered at the state level to allow
for arbitrary patterns in heteroskedasticity and correlation in errors over time in a given state. All
regressions use weighted least square where the weighting is each state’s population.
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Chapter 2 : The Effect of More Severe Punishments for Illegal Gun Carrying on
Crime
2.1. Introduction
The United States has the largest prison population per capita in the world. While the U.S.
incarceration rate was 693 per 100,000 people in 2014, the incarceration rate was only 114 per
100,000 people in Canada.14 Despite this mass incapacitation through incarceration, the U.S. also
suffers from high rates of violent crime. For the majority types of violent crime (murder, robbery,
and forcible rape), the U.S. is rated among the top 10 countries within the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries.15 To illustrate this, the
homicide rate in the U.S. was 4.5 per 100,000 in 2014, while this rate was only 1.4 in Canada.16,17
Due to the simultaneously high rates of crime and incarceration in the U.S., enacting
policies that reduce crime rates without raising the prison population remain at the top of the
research agenda for many criminologists, sociologists, and economists. Among these types of
policies, enhancing punishment severity seems to be a very useful tool that could potentially lower
crime rates. Punishment enhancement could reduce the crime rate through two different
channels—incapacitation and deterrence. However, since incapacitation is costly and puts pressure
on taxpayers, it is the latter that will dictate whether or not harsher sentencing is economically
efficient.
In order to assess the efficiency of increased sentence length on crime rates, this study takes
advantage of the state of New York’s (NY) increased sentence length for illegal gun possession.

14

International Center of Prison Population
http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/crime_stats_oecdjan2012.pdf (Retrieved 6/17/2016)
16
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-16
6/17/2016)
17
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/151125/dq151125a-eng.htm (Retrieved 6/17/2016)
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(Retrieved

NY raised the minimum punishment for carrying handguns illegally from a 1-year prison sentence
to 3.5 years in 2006.18 I use the synthetic control method, along with difference-in-difference (DD)
methodology, to analyze the impact of NY’s punishment enhancement policy on three different
types of crime: robbery, murder, and larceny. Findings indicate that more severe punishment for
the illegal possession of firearms does reduce the crime rate, and a large portion of this reduction
(both in the short and long run) is due to criminal deterrence rather than incapacitation.
2.2. Literature review
Becker’s (1968) paper was the first to introduce an economic model for crime. The crime
model implied that the supply of crime is negatively related to the certainty of punishments (in
terms of the higher probability of conviction and arrest rate) and the severity of punishment. Since
then, there has been an academic debate over the potential advantages of the severity of
punishment. Some researchers (Decker & Kohfeld, 1990; Kim et al., 1993; Doob & Webster, 2003;
Robinson & Darley, 2004) favor the certainty of punishment over the severity of punishment,
while others (Kessler & Levitt, 1999; Mendes & McDonald, 2001; Helland & Tabarrok, 2004; Lee
& McCarry, 2009; Abrams 2011) have shown that the severity of punishment is as important as
other crime-preventing factors and does reduce the crime rate. They argued that model
misspecification is the reason that some prior studies had failed to find statistical support for the
impact of punishment severity.
Kessler and Levitt (1999) were one of the first to distinguish between the deterrence effect
of harsher sentences and incapacitation. The authors assessed the impact of punishment severity
by making use of sentence enhancement in California (CA) for a selected group of crimes.19 In

18

.http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/nyregion/prison-not-as-mandatory-as-ny-state-gun-laws-say.html?_r=2&
(Retrieved 6/17/2016)
19
California’s Proposition 8 passed in 1982.
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order to separate the deterrence and incapacitation effects, they argued that deterrence is the only
cause of a short-run drop in crime rates because a defendant subjected to new punishment would
be imprisoned even in the absence of a law change. According to their findings, more severe types
of punishments have an immediate deterrence effect, which is the main reason for the short-run
crime drop in CA.
Following Kessler and Levitt’s (1999) argument, Abrams (2011) also attempts to separate
the deterrence effect associated with punishment severity from that of incapacitation. For this
purpose, Abrams (2011) evaluates the impact of add-on gun laws on crime rates. Add-on gun laws
impose harsher sentences on offenders who possess firearms during the commission of a felony.
Using cross-state variation, he shows that the deterrence effect of add-on gun laws could reduce
gun robberies by roughly 5 percent in the short run.
In order to study the efficiency of punishment enhancement policies, the current study
makes use of some of the aforementioned papers’ strategies to identify the impact on crime rates
of NY’s increased minimum jail time for illegal possession of a gun. This study, however, differs
substantially from other studies in methodology, type of studied crimes, and conclusion.
2.3. Conceptual Framework
According to Becker’s crime model, more severe punishment will result in crime reduction.
Increasing minimum jail time for illegal possession of a gun in NY could be considered as a more
severe punishment because if an arrested violator commits a crime with an illegal firearm, the
minimum jail time will be added to the normal punishment. Thus, one could hypothesize that NY’s
law change should lead to a decreasing crime trend in the state after enactment of the law in 2006.
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One important issue that should be taken into consideration is that an increase in minimum
jail time for illegal possession of a gun could only deter criminals who are reliant on carrying guns.
Among different types of crimes, according to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) dataset
and previous studies, it could be assumed that for committing murder and robbery, most criminals
need their guns.20 However, for murder, the marginal increase of illegally carrying a gun (2.5 year)
pales in comparison to the magnitude of punishment (death penalty or more than 20 years
imprisonment) for the crime itself. Therefore, more severe punishment for illegal possession of a
gun is only expected to reduce robbery. Yet obtaining no statistical support for murder in a sense
is a placebo test that suggests the results for other robbery are likely not spurious.
Another concern regarding NY’s sentence enhancement is an unintended spillover effect.
If longer prison time for illegal gun carrying causes potential offenders to substitute gun crime
with non-gun crime, looking at only gun-related crimes will not show the complete picture. NY’s
law change is expected to either have a positive effect on non-firearm crime, implying a spillover
effect, or should have no effect at all. If the estimates show a negative and significant impact on
non-firearm crimes, it could be concluded that there exist unobservable criminogenic factors that
induce a spurious correlation with crime rates. By testing for larceny, which is a non-gun crime, I
also check for this possibility.
Using NY’s punishment enhancement for illegal possession of a gun in a sense is analogous
to add-on gun laws used in Abrams (2011) but differs in important ways. First, compared to addon gun laws, harsher sentencing for illegal possession of a gun could potentially have a stronger
effect on crime rates. Unlike add-on gun laws, according to NY’s laws, whether or not an arrested

20

Mendes and McDonald (2001), Lee and McCray (2009), Abrams (2011), and May (2014)
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violator commits a crime with an illegal handgun, s/he still has to serve at least minimum jail time
for carrying the gun (which has increased to 3.5 years instead of 1 year). This could deter criminals
directly from possessing illegal guns, which, correspondingly, would lead to fewer gun-related
crimes.
Second, in order to estimate the effect of punishment severity, the common approach used
in the literature is simple DD methodology. In DD methodology, the basic assumption is that the
control group is a good counterfactual for the treatment group. In this study, the synthetic control
method is used along with DD to ensure that control states are good counterfactuals for NY. This
means that absent the intervention, we would expect the same pattern of outcomes to exist over
time in both group types.
2.4. Data and Background
Gun carry regulations differ across the U.S. Different states have enacted either “shall
issue”, “may issue”, “no issue”, or “unrestricted” gun carry laws.21 Except unrestricted states, in
all other states, it is illegal to carry a handgun without the required permit and violators will be
punished by fines or imprisonment. Depending on state-specific regional characteristics, crime
history, and government priorities, the severity of punishment for illegal handgun carrying varies
across states. These punishments vary from up to a $500 fine (Oklahoma) to up to a $15,000 fine
(Pennsylvania). The punishment also includes mandatory minimum imprisonment in different
states, which range from 10 days (Oklahoma) to 3.5 years (NY).22

21

*A “May-Issue” Law is one that requires a permit to carry a concealed handgun, and where the granting of such
permits is at the discretion of local authorities (frequently the sheriff's department or police)
*A “No-Issue” Law is one that does not allow any private citizen to carry a concealed handgun in public
*An “Unrestricted gun carry” Laws are those that allow any private citizen to purchase, sell, and carry a concealed
handgun in public without any restrictions. Before 2003 Vermont was the only state with No-Control law. Alaska
(2003), Arizona (2011), and Wyoming (2013) switch back to unrestricted laws as well.
22
http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/topics/gun-possession-and-use (Retrieved 6/17/2016)
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In this study, I used the FBI-UCR dataset, which provides quarterly variation for 3 different
types of crime (murder, robbery, and larceny). I removed Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Kansas,
Minnesota, District of Colombia, and Vermont because the quarterly data was not available. Table
1 reports the mean of crime rates and other control variables in the analysis for both NY and other
potential control states for the period of 2001-2010. Except for the robbery rate, which is relatively
high in NY, the means of other crimes is relatively lower in NY than other states.
Apart from punishment severity, there are also many other factors (e.g., economic
conditions or demographic information) that could possibly change the level of crime in NY.
Following most of the studies in crime literature, in order to capture the impact of other factor on
crime rates, I added a log of population by age, race, and sex groups as control variables to this
study’s models. All demographic data is obtained from the U.S. Census database. Since the
quarterly data is not available for demographic variables, I used yearly measures for all
demographic variables (inherently making the assumption that the quarterly variations in
population are relatively small). I also controlled for unemployment rates obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in order to capture the effect of the great recession that took place
in early 2008.
2.5. Methodology
As NY is the only treated state that increased the minimum jail time for illegally carrying
a gun, using simple DD methodology is problematic because the control states are not good
counterfactuals for NY. For instance, crime in NY is not comparable to crime trend in small states
like MS, ND, SD, etc. Thus, I use the synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003),
which is the most appropriate model in the literature to determine a more accurate control group
(i.e., the synthetic control) for NY. The synthetic control is simply a weighted average of all
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potential control states. These weights are chosen such that the resulting synthetic control states
best reproduce the values of a set of predictors of the crime rate in NY before the change in penalty
occurs in 2006.
Therefore, the synthetic control method is used as the main model to study the effect of
this event. Using synthetic control states and their associated weights for each crime (reported in
Table 2) I also apply the DD technique to analyze the effect of more severe punishment on crime
rates as a robustness check. For this purpose, I estimate
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Subscript “s” denotes states, subscript “y” denotes years, and subscript “q” denotes quarter. The
terms
∗

, , and (/ are the state, year, and quarter fixed effect dummy variables. I also added
in order to control for state-specific time trends, where T is a quarterly linear time trend.

While state-specific time trends likely provide the most robust estimates, I also present the
evidence without state trend. The variable CR is the log of number of crimes per 100,000 for the
3 different categories of crimes that were mentioned earlier.
I use the natural log of the crime rate because it is easier to interpret the results and
coefficients. Vector X contains a set of predictors of the crime rate, which is added to the model
to increase the validity of estimations. The predictors of crime rate are unemployment, population
density, and population by age groups, race, and sex. The variable of interest (punish) is a dummy
that is set to one for NY after 2006 and zero otherwise. Parameter

should be negative and

statistically significant for robbery, which indicates to a negative impact of more severe
punishment on crime rates.
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2.6. Results
As explained, the synthetic control method is being used in order to find states that most
closely matched NY in terms of pre-intervention values of crime predictors. Utilizing the synthetic
control method, control states and their associated weights for each type of crime separately are
found and outlined in Table 2. Among these control states, California (CA), Illinois (IL), Maryland
(MD), and New Jersey (NJ) are among the closest states to NY in terms of demography,
unemployment rate, and crime characteristics.
Figure 1 is plotted using obtained control states and their associated weights. This figure
displays the robbery trends in NY and its respective synthetic control during the period of 20012010. As figure makes it apparent, before 2006 the rates of robbery are very similar in both NY
and its synthetic control. Right after NY raised the punishment severity in 2006, the two lines
(robbery trend in NY and its synthetic control) begin to diverge noticeably. These discrepancies
are indicative of the fact that the increase in punishment severity for illegal gun possession is
effective in terms of crime reduction and has contributed to the decreasing crime trend in NY post
2006.
Figure 2 plots the quarterly estimate of the impacts of NY’s law change on robbery rates,
which is the quarterly gap in robbery rates between NY and its associated synthetic control. This
figure suggests that punishment enhancement in NY had a large effect on robbery rate. According
to Figure 2, the magnitude of the estimated impact of NY’s punishment enhancement appears
substantial and this impact increased over time.
In order to distinguish between the short-run deterrence effects of NY’s harsher
punishment from that of incapacitation, I use Kessler and Levitt’s (1999) argument, which implies
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that the crime rate falls in the short run only due to the deterrence. Based on their argument,
defendants subjected to the law change in NY would be imprisoned for at least 1 year even in the
absence of law change. Thus, any impact on crime rates during the year after enhancing the
punishment must be solely due to the immediate deterrence. As Figure 1 makes it evident, crime
rates in NY fall immediately after the adoption of harsher sentences in 2006, which insinuating
that a large portion of crime reduction in the short run is due to a criminal deterrence. Yet, as
expected, the reduction pace increases over time as the incapacitation effect comes into play as
well.
In order to determine whether or not deterrence effect still plays a substantial role in the
long run, I track NY’s prison population after 2006. If NY’s prison population does not increase
dramatically after 2006, it could be hypothesized that NY’s punishment enhancement does not
influence the effect of incapacitation on crime rates. If this is the case, the long-run impact of NY’s
harsher punishment on crime rates could also be attributed mostly to criminal deterrence.
Surprisingly, NY’s incarceration trend shows that in spite of existence of longer sentence time for
illegal gun possession, NY’s incarceration rate has been decreasing since 2006.23 Assuming no
significant change in non-gun related crimes, this observation would support the hypothesis of the
long-run negative impact of criminal deterrence on crime rates. Larceny results, which is indicative
of non-gun related crimes and will be explained in section 6.2, provides evidence in support of the
assumption of little to no change in overall non-gun related crimes.
As of this point, findings indicate that increased punishment severity for illegal gun
carrying in NY is an efficient policy since it appears to have reduced crime rates and large portion

23

http://www.sentencingproject.org/the-facts/#map (Retrieved 6/17/2016)
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of this reduction is mostly through the deterrence channel. However, some sort of significance test
is required to show that these finding are not obtained by chance. To this end, in the next section I
run falsification tests, which are considered significance tests for the synthetic control method in
the literature.
2.6.1.

Inference about the effect of the New York punishment enhancement
In the synthetic control studies, there is always the question of whether the outcomes could

be driven entirely by chance. To answer this question, similar to Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), I run a placebo tests. To assess the significance of
estimates, I iteratively apply synthetic control method to every state in the donor pool that did not
change their punishment severity during the sample period of this study. In each iteration, I assign
one of the 43 states in the former control group as a treated state as if it would have passed the
punishment enhancement in 2006, instead of NY. If the placebo studies for other states create gaps
similar to the one estimated for NY, it could be concluded that the analysis of this paper does not
provide significant evidence to support the negative effect of NY’s punishment enhancement on
crime rates. If on the other hand the estimated gaps for NY is unusually larger than the gaps
estimated in placebo studies for other states that did not change their law, then it could be
concluded that the analysis provides significant evidence for negative effect of NY’s punishment
enhancement on crime rates.
Figure 3 displays the results for the placebo tests. The placebo procedure provides a series
of estimated gaps for the states in which no intervention took place. The gray lines show the
difference between robbery rates in each state in the donor pool and that of associated synthetic
version. The black line represents the estimated gap for NY, which is also shown in Figures 2. In
order to have a clean picture, I dropped states with poor pre-intervention fit. For this purpose, I
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calculate the pre-intervention mean square prediction error (MSPE) for all states including NY.
MSPE is the average of the square discrepancies between the actual robbery rate in NY and its
synthetic counterpart during the period 2001-2006. The pre-intervention MSPE for robbery in NY
is about 7. I exclude all states with pre-intervention MSPE two times higher than NY’s.
As Figure 3 indicates, the estimated gap for NY outsizes all the estimated gaps for other
states in the donor pool during the entire post-treatment period. In both figures there are lines for
few states (NM and NC) that still negatively deviate considerably from the zero after 2006.
However, as mentioned, the estimated gap for NY is still noticeably larger than their estimated
gap. These findings corroborate the fact that the NY results, presented in Figures 1 and 2, have not
been driven by chance and the more severe punishment for illegal gun carrying is the reason that
robbery rate has fallen in NY after 2006.
Following Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2009), the final way to assess the
significance of the estimates is to look at the distribution of the ratios of post/pre-intervention
MSEP. Figure 4 displays this distribution for robbery rate in NY and also in all other control states.
NY’s post-intervention MSPE for robbery is about 13 times the pre-intervention MSEP. None of
the control states in the donor pool has such a large ratio. This means that if one randomly assigns
the intervention in different states, the probability of obtaining a post/pre-intervention MSEP ratio
as large as NY’s is 1/44.
2.6.2. Robustness check
As discussed before, larceny and murder should not be affected by NY’s harsher
punishment for illegal gun possession. Using the synthetic control method, Figures 5 and 6 are
plotted for murder and larceny. As these figures indicate, murder and larceny trends almost always
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follow the same trend both in NY and its respective synthetic control. Unlike robbery, they do not
diverge noticeably after 2006. These findings confirm the hypothesis that the severity of
punishments for illegal possession of firearms reduces the crime rate, but it only affects what prior
research has identified as gun-related crimes. Obtaining no alteration for larceny rate after 2006
also suggests that criminals do not shift from gun crimes to non-gun crimes and there is no spillover
effect.
Additionally, considering the states which are obtained from the synthetic method as a
control states for NY, I apply the WLS method to estimate model (1) for each type of crime. In
this estimation, the Cluster-Robust Variance-Matrix Estimation (CRVE) techniques are used to
estimate standard deviations. Following the previous papers in crime literature, I control for
unemployment rate, population density, and population by age, race, and sex groups to have more
precise estimations. Results for all 4 types of crime (both with and without state-specific time
trends) are reported in Table 3. While the DD’s coefficient are negative for all types of crime, they
are only statistically significant for robbery. The DD results verify the synthetic control method’s
findings, which imply that more severe punishments for illegal gun possession are effective and
do reduce gun-related crimes.
2.7. Conclusion:
Using different econometric techniques, many researchers have tried to determine how
more severe punishments can affect crime rates. While the majority of these studies conclude that
the punishment severity plays an important role in reducing crime, not many pay attention to the
distinction between deterrence and incapacitation. Using NY as a treated state, this paper studies
the effect of increasing the minimum jail time for carrying a gun illegally on crime rates.
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Additionally, it analyzes how much of the potential reduction could be attributed to the deterrence
effect of harsher punishment.
The state of NY increased the minimum jail time for carrying loaded handguns without the
required permit to 3.5 years in 2006. Findings of both the synthetic control methods and DD
regressions imply that gun-related crime rates (robbery) in NY dropped after 2006. This means
more severe punishment deters criminals from carrying a gun illegally, which may eventually
result in lower gun-related crime rates. Findings also suggest that most of the crime reduction is
due to the deterrence of law change rather that incarceration. This confirms that harsher sentences
for gun law violators are economically efficient, as they could reduce the crime rate without
incurring higher cost on tax payers.
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York and 43 Control States
16

14

12

10

8

6

4

NY

2

0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

43

8

9

10

11

12

13

Figure 2.5. Trends for Larceny per 100,000 people: New york vs. Synthetic Control
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Table 2.1. Means and properties of key variable in analysis Before Treatment
Variable
N
Means for
Means for
Synthetic
New York
Control states
State
Crime rates are defined per 100,000
people:
Robbery
Larceny
Murder

1696
1696
1696

25.6515
526.4328
1.1277

39.9698
379.2405
1.094194

Population Characteristic:
State population
Population per square mile
Male population
Female population

1696
1696
1696
1696

5895456
203.8588
2905924
2997458

19200000
408.0758
9301425
9929717

Race Age data (%of population)
White
Black
Other Race
Hispanic
Male 10-19
Male 20- 29
Male 30-39
Male 40-49
Female 10-19
Female 20- 29
Female 30-39
Female 40-49

1696
1696
1696
1696
1696
1696
1696
1696
1696
1696
1696
1696

81.62
10.62
7.79
9.43
7.35
6.93
6.67
7.51
6.96
6.68
6.67
7.51

72.31
17.41
10.25
17.11
6.99
7.06
6.55
7.29
6.67
7.09
6.80
7.65

Unemployment rate:

1696

5.67

6.31
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Table 2.2. Synthetic control states for different types of crime

State
AZ
CA
DE
HI
MD
NV
NJ
NC

Robbery
Weight
0.04
0.114
0.226
0.010
0.180
0.139
0.211
0.079

State
CA
GA
HI
MS
OH
PA

Larceny
Weight
0.393
0.171
0.002
0.001
0.173
0.261

State
AZ
DE
GA
HI
MA
MS
NJ
NC

Murder
Weight
0.092
0.039
0.226
0.058
0.243
0.063
0.209
0.070

Table 2.3. Effect of more severe punishments on crime rates in the state of NY (2001-2010)
VARIABLES
Estimation using CRVE
Without State-specific Trend
Punishment
With State-specific Trend
Punishment

Robbery

Larceny

Murder

-0.130**
(0.049)

-0.111
(0.141)

-0.007
(0.013)

-0.0966*
(0.0450)

-0.078
(0.134)

-0.0149
(0.0279)

Year and Quarter Fixed Effect
yes
yes
State Fixed effect
yes
yes
***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively

yes
yes

The treatment variable is “punishment” that equals one for the state of NY after 2006 (when NY
raised the punishment for illegal gun carrying from 1 year to 3.5 years) and zero otherwise.
Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary patterns
in heteroskedasticity and correlation in errors over time in a given state.
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Chapter 3 : Evaluating the Effect of Punishment Severity on Crime Rate
3.1. Introduction
The U.S. houses a greater share of its population in prison than any other country in the
world. The U.S. incarceration rate was 693 per 100,000 people in 2014.24 This rate for more than
half of the countries in the world is below 150 per 100,000 and is only 114 per 100,000 people in
Canada.25 This mass incarceration is very costly and puts pressure on tax payers. The average cost
of an inmate in the U.S is over $30,000 a year.26 Additionally, negative externalities from
incarceration extend to prisoners’ families as well as their social networks and communities. Not
only do inmates’ family income fall, many of them have dependent minors who are likely to be
expelled or suspended from school (Western and Pettit, 2010). Ironically, decades of mass
imprisonment have coincided with the U.S. being consistently rated among the top 10 in terms of
violent crime among developed countries.27
Punishment enhancement is a policy that has been adopted regularly by governments in
order to reduce crime rates. A common conjecture is that a rise in punishment severity could reduce
crime and most of the reduction is through the deterrence channel rather than incapacitation.
However, there is a strong disagreement among researchers about the effectiveness of such policies
as most of these policies have so far largely contributed to increases in prison population. One
thing researchers do agree on is that policies that could reduce prison population without increasing
the crime rate are most welcome.

24

International Center of Prison Population
http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/wppl_10.pdf (retrieved on 10/22/2016 )
26
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/03/09/2015-05437/annual-determination-of-average-cost-ofincarceration (retrieved on 10/22/2016 )
27
http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/crime_stats_oecdjan2012.pdf (Retrieved 10/22/2016)
25
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To this end, some states have altered sentencing for low-level nonviolent offences (e.g.,
low-level drug and thefts offences).28 Arkansas (AR), the subject of this analysis, increased the
felony threshold for theft from $500 to $1000 in 2011, moving most theft cases to district court.29
This achieved a reduction in the prison population in 2012.30 However, AR might experience two
effects. First, the lower punishment for theft might increase the incidence of that crime. Second,
fewer thieves in prison might mean an increase in other types of crime (i.e. if thieves are more
prone to committing other types of crime as well).
Unlike previous studies, which tend to analyze the impact of harsher sentences on the crime
rate, I exploit AR’s less punitive sentence for theft crimes. The findings of this paper indicate that
the change led to higher theft rates in AR after 2011 but not for other crimes. These findings reveal
that crime-specific punishment severity plays a pivotal role in crime prevention through
deterrence. This is valuable information that could help policy makers to adopt efficient policies
in order to achieve their anti-criminogenic goals. For serious and violent offences, punishment
enhancement could act like preventive policies that could reduce the crime rate without putting
more people in prison. For low-level offenses however, adopting less punitive senesces are far
more cost-effective than putting offenders in prison.
3.2. Literature review
Becker (1968) posited that the crime rate is negatively related to the punishment severity
and the probability of conviction. Both conviction and punishment could reduce crime rates
through two different channels—incapacitation and deterrence. Since incapacitation is costly,

28

Arkansas (2011), Kentucky (2011), Georgia (2012), California (2013)
http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/what-to-expect-california-prop-47/ (retrieved on 10/22/2016)
30
http://www.sentencingproject.org/the-facts/#map?dataset-option=SIR (retrieved on 10/22/2016 )
29
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crime prevention policies could be economically efficient when a sufficient number of crimes are
reduced solely through deterrence.
Becker’s findings prompted a large number of academic studies to analyze the role of
punishment severity on crime rates. After reviewing the existing (and conflicting) literature and
undertaking their own evaluation, Mendes and McDonald (2001) argued that the severity of
punishment is as important as other crime-preventing factors and does reduce the crime rate. Yet,
Doob and Webster (2003) noted that all previous studies suffer from endogeneity, thereby
providing limited statistical support for the deterrence effect of punishment severity.
The next wave of studies, within which this study falls, uses quasi-experimental analysis
to identify deterrence effects of more severe punishment. Helland and Tabarrok (2007) use
California's three-strike legislation and conclude crime rates are reduced among the class of
criminals with two strikes. Lee and McCarry (2009) use the fact that offenders younger than a
certain age (typically 18) are subject to less punitive sentences than adults. They claim that states
with larger jumps in punishment tend to have lower adult crime rates. Abrams (2011) examines
the deterrence effect of add-on gun laws that impose harsher sentences for offenders who possess
firearms during the commission of a felony. He shows add-on gun laws reduce gun robberies by
roughly 5 percent.
To the best of my knowledge, all previous studies investigate harsher sentences to analyze
the impact of punishment severity on crime rates. A problem associated with using harsher
sentences is that one could not distinguish between the deterrence effects of harsher punishment
from that of incapacitation. In this paper however, AR’s milder sentence is exploited to analyze
the effectiveness of punishment policies. It could be assumed that any increase on theft rates after
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lowering the punishment could be mostly due to the lower level of deterrence, especially if we do
not see a corresponding increase in other crimes.
From a practical standpoint, the increase in crime due to AR’s higher felony threshold for
theft would be expected to affect larceny (bicycle theft, shoplifting, and pick-pocketing).
Specifically, larceny offenders perceive the costs of stealing items between $500 and $1000 to be
lower than before the threshold increase. According to this hypothesis, AR‘s 2011 adjustment of
the felony threshold for theft from $500 to $1000 should lead to an increasing larceny rate,
suggesting criminals respond to the reduced crime-specific cost of committing a crime.
Since incapacitation of potential criminals is likely to be reduced (fewer people would be
incarcerated for theft) we might also expect to witness an increase in other types of crime in AR.
However, if rates of crime unrelated to theft are unchanged after AR’s 2011 law change, one could
hypothesize a stronger role for deterrence over incapacitation in sentencing. To this end, I analyze
the impact of AR’s law change on motor vehicle theft and aggravated assault. Motor vehicle theft
because a vehicles’ value is almost always greater than $1000 and aggravated assault because it is
completely a non-theft crime. Additionally, obtaining null results for these types of crime in a
sense is a placebo test that would suggests the results for larceny is likely not spurious.
3.3. Data and Methodology
Since AR is the only treated state that increased the felony threshold for theft, using simple
difference-in-difference (DD) methodology is problematic because the control states are not good
counterfactuals for AR. For instance, crime in AR could not be compared to crime trends in big
states like NY, IL, CA, etc. Therefore, I use the synthetic control method, which is the most
appropriate model according to the literature. Using this method enables one to find a more
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accurate control group (synthetic control) for AR. That is, instead of comparing AR with all states
that did not change their laws, AR will be only compared with one control unit (synthetic control),
which is a weighted average of all non-treated states. These weights are chosen such that the
resulting synthetic control best reproduces criminogenic characteristics of AR before the change
in felony threshold occurs in 2011. The mathematical proof for the synthetic control group is
beyond the scope of this paper (for the full proof see, Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003).
Synthetic control is used as the main model to study the effect of AR’s milder punishment
on crime. Yet, as a robustness check, I also apply the DD technique to analyze the effect of less
severe punishment on crime rates. For this purpose, I estimate:
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Subscript s denotes states, subscript y denotes years, and subscript m denotes months. The
terms
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are the state, year, and month fixed effect dummy variables. Variable X

contains a set of predictors of the crime rate, which is added to the model to increase the efficiency
of estimation. The predictors of crime rate are: unemployment, population density, population by
age groups, race and sex. “Lessspun” is the variable of interest and is set to one for AR after 2011
and zero otherwise.
In this paper, crime data (larceny, motor vehicle theft, and aggravated assault) are collected
from FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) dataset for the period between 2008 and 2013. I use
monthly crime rates for all states where information is available. This excludes Alabama, Florida,
Hawaii, Kansas, Minnesota, and New York. To predict crime trends, I follow the conventional use
of the log of population by age groups, race and sex. All demographic data are collected from the
U.S. Census. As monthly data are not available for demographic variables, I assume that such
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variation in the population is small and use yearly measures for all demographic variables. I also
control for unemployment rates obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in order to capture
the effect of economic conditions. The mean of crime rates and other control variables used in the
analysis are reported in Table 1 for both AR and other non-treated states.
3.4. Results
3.4.1

Effects of AR’s increased larceny threshold
As explained, the synthetic control method, which is the most appropriate model, is used

in this paper to find states that most closely resemble AR in terms of pre-intervention demography,
economy and crime characteristics. The synthetic control states and their associated weights for
each type of crime are reported in Table 2. Among these control states, Iowa (IA), Louisiana (LA),
Mississippi (MS), Missouri (MO), Oklahoma (OK), and South Carolina (SC) are among the closest
states to AR.
Figure 1 illustrates the larceny trends in AR and its relevant synthetic control states for the
period of 2008-2013. Due to the noise in the monthly crime dataset, I use a moving average to
smooth the crime trends. According to Figure 1, before 2011 the rates of larceny are very similar
in both AR and its respective synthetic state. However, once AR raised the felony threshold for
theft in 2011, AR’s larceny rate diverges from that of the synthetic state and shows an increasing
trend.
Figure 2 plots the monthly estimates of the impacts of AR’s punishment reduction on
larceny rate, which is the monthly gap in larceny rate between AR and its associated synthetic
states. This figure suggests that the magnitude of the estimated impact of AR’s law change is
substantial and this impact increases over time. Looking at Figures 1 and 2, it could be concluded
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that on average, AR’s milder punishment for theft increases larceny rate by approximately 6
percent.
3.4.2.

Inference
Similar to other statistical models, the synthetic control studies must provide some sort of

significance test to prove that the outcomes are not driven by chance. Following Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), I run falsification tests, which
are considered significance tests for the synthetic control method in the literature. To assess the
significance of estimates, I iteratively perform the synthetic control method for every state in the
donor pool that did not change their punishment severity during the sample period of this study.
In each iteration, I assign one of the 44 states in the former control group as a treated state as if it
increased the felony threshold for theft, instead of AR. If the placebo studies for other states create
gaps similar or bigger than the one estimated for AR, it could be concluded that there is not enough
evidence to support the augmenting impact of AR’s punishment adjustment on larceny rate. On
the other hand, if the estimated gap for AR is unusually larger than the gaps estimated for other
states that did not change their law, then it could be concluded that the analysis provides significant
evidence for the impact of punishment severity on the crime rate.
Figure 3 displays the results of the placebo test. The placebo procedure provides a series
of estimated gaps for AR as well as all other states that have not changed their laws. The gray lines
show the difference in rate of larceny per 100,000 and its synthetic version for the states in which
no intervention took place. The black line represents the estimated gap for AR, which is the line
that was also shown in Figure 2. For clarity, following Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2009),
states with poor pre-intervention fit were dropped. For this purpose, I calculate the pre-intervention
mean square prediction error (MSPE) for all states including AR (the average of the square
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discrepancies between the actual larceny rate in AR and its synthetic counterpart during the period
2008-2013). The pre intervention MSPE for larceny in AR is about 0.006. I exclude all staes with
pre-intervention MSPE three times higher than AR’s. As the Figure 3 makes apparent, the
estimated gaps for AR outsize all the estimated gaps for other states in the donor pool during the
entire post-treatment period. This confirms that outcomes have not been driven by chance and the
less severe punishment for low-level theft in AR is the reason that larceny rate has rose in AR after
2011.
Following Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2009), the final method of assessing the
significance of the estimates is to look at the distribution of the ratios of post/pre-intervention
MSEP. Figure 4 depicts the distributions for larceny rate in AR as well as in all other control states.
According to this figure, AR’s post-intervention MSPE for larceny is about 14 times the preintervention MSEP. None of the control states in a donor pool have such a large ratio. This means,
if one randomly assigns the intervention in different states, the probability of obtaining a post/preintervention MSEP ratio as large as AR’s is 1/45.
3.4.3

Robustness check
As mentioned earlier, motor vehicle theft and aggravated assault should not be affected by

the rise in the felony threshold for theft in AR. Using the synthetic control method, Figures 5-6
show trends for motor vehicle theft and aggravated assault. Motor vehicle theft and aggravated
assault trends in AR and in its respective synthetic states do not diverge after the law change occurs
in 2011. These findings confirm the hypothesis that the deterrence role of crime prevention is more
crucial than that of incapacitation. Although incarceration rates might have decreased in AR, the
lower incapacitation rate does not provoke potential offenders to commit other crimes. Obtaining
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no significant deviation for motor vehicle theft and aggravated assault rates after 2011 also verifies
that the results for larceny are not driven by chance and are likely not spurious.
Additionally, considering the states which are obtained from the synthetic method as
control states for AR, I apply the Weighted Lease Square (WLS) method to estimate model (1) for
each type of crime. In this estimation, the Cluster-Robust Variance-Matrix Estimation (CRVE)
techniques are used to estimate standard deviations. Following the crime literature, to have more
precise estimates, I control for unemployment rate, population density, and population by age, race
and sex. Results for all 3 types of crime are reported in Table 3. For larceny and motor vehicle
theft the DD’s coefficients are positive but it is negative for aggravated assault. However, only
larceny’s coefficient is statistically significant. The DD results verify the synthetic control
methods’ findings, which imply criminals respond to the severity of crime-specific punishment.
3.5. Conclusion:
Unlike all previous studies, which use harsher sentences to determine the impact of
punishment severity on the crime rate, I use AR’s punitive reduction for the analysis of punishment
severity. AR increased the felony threshold for theft from $500 to $1000 in 2011 to achieve a
reduction in the prison population. The advantage of using milder punishment over harsher
sentences is distinguishing between the deterrence and incapacitation effects of punishment
severity. It could be assumed that any change in crime rates after a decrease in punishment severity
(like what was done in AR), could be due mostly to a change in the criminal deterrence. That is, a
decrease in punishment severity reduces the expected cost of committing low-level thefts, which
will affect criminals’ behavior
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The findings in/of this paper imply that, even though AR’s punishment adjustment led to
a decrease in the prison population in 2012, it also resulted in higher larceny rates (low-level theft
crime). These findings confirm that criminals respond to the crime-specific costs. Results also
show that despite the likely lower incarceration rate, rates of crime unrelated to theft do not change,
suggesting that criminal deterrence has a greater ability to reduce crime than incapacitation.
According to these findings, reducing punishment severity for low-level crimes is an
efficient policy that could be adopted by governments in order to reduce the prison population, but
comes with the added implication of increased low-level crime rates. This suggest the inclusion of
other supplementary policies (e.g., higher fines, home prisoned, or mandatory rehab programs) in
order to control this likely rise in the number of low-level offences.
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Figure 3.3. Larceny per 100,000 People: Gap for all states including AR (24 states)
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Figure 3.4. Ratio of Post-intervention MSPE and Pre-intervention MSPE for Larceny: Arkansas
and 44 Control States
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Table 3.1. Means and properties of key variable in analysis Before Treatment
Variable
N
Means for
Means for
Synthetic states
Arkansas
Crime rates are defined per 100,000
people:
Larceny
3240
162.46
187.99
Motor Vehicle theft
3240
20.07
16.74
Aggravated Assault
3240
20.23
29.31
Population Characteristic:
State population
Population per square mile
Male population
Female population

3240
3240
3240
3240

5722346
414.0256
2845624
2904889

2900182
55.73
1423539
1476643

Race Age data (%of population)
White
Black
Other Race
Hispanic
Male 10-19
Male 20- 29
Male 30-39
Male 40-49
Male 50-64
Male over 64
Female 10-19
Female 20- 29
Female 30-39
Female 40-49
Female 50-64
Female over 64

3240
3240
3240
3240
3240
3240
3240
3240
3240
3240
3240
3240
3240
3240
3240
3240

81.50
11.23
7.38
10.41
7.11
7.12
6.48
7.06
9.51
5.71
6.72
6.85
6.38
7.10
9.84
7.37

80.44
15.58
3.98
6.20
7.04
6.80
6.30
6.66
9.12
6.21
6.73
6.73
6.28
6.78
9.67
8.10

Unemployment rate:

3240

7.59

6.96
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Table 3.2. Synthetic control states and their associated weights
Larceny
Motor Vehicle Theft

Aggravated assault

State

Weight

State

Weight

State

Weight

AZ
DE
LA
MO
OK
SC
WV

0.027
0.093
0.132
0.028
0.191
0.485
0.043

IA
MS
MO
NC
OK
SC

0.286
0.090
0.027
0.194
0.363
0.040

DC
MO
NM
OK
SC
TN
UT
WV

0.013
0.202
0.215
0.347
0.080
0.034
0.025
0.084

Table 3.3. Effect of punishment severity using synthetic control results
VARIABLES
Larceny
Motor Vehicle Theft
Aggravated Assault
0.109***
0.018
-0.021
Lesspun
(0.0110)
(0.0325)
(0.0160)
576
504
648
Observations
***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
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